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Abstract. Simulatability has established itself as a salient notion for defining and
proving the security of cryptographic protocols since it entails strong security and
compositionality guarantees, which are achieved by universally quantifying over all
environmental behaviors of the analyzed protocol. As a consequence, however, pro-
tocols that are secure except for certain environmental behaviors are not simulatable,
even if these behaviors are efficiently identifiable and thus can be prevented by the
surrounding protocol.
We propose a relaxation of simulatability by conditioning the permitted environmen-
tal behaviors, i.e., simulation is only required for environmental behaviors that fulfill
explicitly stated constraints. This yields a more fine-grained security definition that is
achievable for several protocols for which unconditional simulatability is too strict a
notion, or at lower cost for the underlying cryptographic primitives. Although impos-
ing restrictions on the environment destroys unconditional composability in general,
we show that the composition of a large class of conditionally simulatable protocols
yields protocols that are again simulatable under suitable conditions. This even holds
for the case of cyclic assume-guarantee conditions where protocols only guarantee
suitable behavior if they themselves are offered certain guarantees. Furthermore, com-
posing several commonly investigated protocol classes with conditionally simulatable
subprotocols yields protocols that are again simulatable in the standard, unconditional
sense.
1 Introduction
Simulatability-based Security. As a tool to define and prove the security of cryptographic
protocols, the concept of simulatability has a long history, e.g., [3–7]. In recent years, in par-
ticular the general simulatability frameworks of reactive simulatability [8–10] and universal
composability [11, 12] proved useful for analyzing security properties of cryptographic pro-
tocols in distributed systems.
One advantage of simulatability-based approaches is the simple and straightforward def-
inition of security. Namely, security is defined by comparison to an ideal specification of the
respective protocol task. Usually, such an ideal specification is given by a single machine
called trusted host, which is immune to any adversarial attacks by construction. Now a
⋆ An earlier version of this paper appeared in [1, 2].
protocol is said to be secure if all of its weaknesses are already reflected in the ideal spec-
ification. More specifically, for any possible attack on the real protocol, there should be a
corresponding (by construction harmless) ideal attack on the trusted host. We require that
these attacks must be indistinguishable in the sense that no protocol environment can dis-
tinguish between running with the real protocol and the real attack, and running with the
trusted host and the ideal attack. In that sense, the real protocol is at least as secure as the
ideal specification. Because the ideal attack is to give the impression of a real attack, the
ideal attacker is also called simulator.
Composition. Another advantage of such a simulatability-based definition of security is the
possibility to compose protocols without loss of security. Very general composition theo-
rems have been proven in [13, 11, 14, 15] for simulatability-based frameworks. In a nutshell,
this means that any protocolM that is (in the above sense) at least as secure as an ideal spec-
ification M ′ can be substituted in any protocol context for M ′. The resulting protocol that
uses M will be at least as secure as the one that uses M ′. On a technical level, this is not at
all surprising: one could view the larger protocol simply as part of the protocol environment
of M , resp. M ′. Then security of M in presence of all protocol environments in particular
implies security in presence of the larger protocol. However, although not surprising, this
compositionality greatly aids modular protocol design: large protocols can be designed and
analyzed using ideal building blocks. In a second step, these ideal building blocks can be
substituted with cryptographic implementations.
This methodology is illustrated in Figure 1. In this figure, L represents a larger protocol
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Fig. 1. Illustration of a secure composition of systems. Think of L as a larger protocol that uses M ′ as
a(n ideal) subprotocol. Secure composition means that M ′ can be substituted with M if M is a secure
realization of M ′. In particular, L can be analyzed in combination with the ideal, easier-to-handle
protocol M ′, while only later replacing M ′ with M .
that can be analyzed in combination with idealized subprotocols M ′ (e.g., M ′ could be a
secure channel or an idealized signature scheme). Later, M ′ can be replaced with a secure
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instantiation (like a concrete cryptographic encryption or signature scheme) without loss of
security.
As an example of the usefulness of this paradigm, general protocol constructions like the
secure multi-party computation protocol of [5] can be analyzed conveniently and modularly
in a simulatability-based setting [16]. Also, compositional properties are a key ingredient
for the BPW model [9, 17–19] that relates security properties of abstract, Dolev-Yao style
protocols with those of cryptographic implementations. This in particular enabled the first
composable yet cryptographically sound security proofs of various security protocols [20–
25]. Interestingly, it has even been shown that a variety of security properties are preserved
under this paradigm [26–28, 26, 29–31].
The Price of Composability and the Commitment Problem. Unfortunately, such nice com-
positional properties are bought at a certain price. To provide an easy example, consider
the task of a secure message transmission from Alice to Bob, where both already possess a
common secret key for a symmetric encryption scheme. In a real protocol, Alice simply en-
crypts her message and sends the ciphertext to Bob. In the ideal setting, Alice simply inputs
her message (unobserved by an ideal adversary) into the trusted host, who then delivers the
unaltered message secretly to Bob. To show the real protocol secure, any real attack must
have an ideal counterpart, such that both are indistinguishable in any protocol environment.
Now observe that in the real protocol, Alice essentially commits herself to the message as
soon as she sends the ciphertext to Bob. (Especially if the underlying message is sufficiently
long and has enough entropy, a ciphertext already uniquely determines key and message.)
Imagine a real adversary that eavesdrops Alice’s ciphertext and announces it to the protocol
environment, “just for the record.” After this, the adversary corrupts Alice and can then,
using Alice’s internal state, explain to the protocol environment the observed ciphertext as
an encryption of the transmitted message under the predistributed key.
But as senseless and meaningless as such an attack seems, it has no ideal counterpart.
To be indistinguishable from the real attack just described, an ideal adversary has to first an-
nounce a ciphertext and only then may corrupt Alice (who now merely handed the message
as input to the trusted host) to obtain her message. However, this ideal adversary already
commits itself to a message when announcing the ciphertext, and it cannot explain this
ciphertext as an encryption of Alice’s message.
This problem is sometimes called the commitment problem of symmetric encryption,
and it caused a surprising technical restriction in the symmetric encryption primitive in the
aforementioned BPW model [9, 17, 19]. Essentially, this restriction forbids the corruption of
protocol parties that have already used their secret encryption key. (Corrupting parties that
did not use their secret key so far is fine.) This way, it is guaranteed that an ideal adversary
is never forced to explain a ciphertext it made up as an encryption of a particular, a priori
unknown message.
We stress however, that without such restrictions, there is no symmetric encryption
scheme that could be (again, in the sense of simulatable security) at least as secure as an
idealized, symbolic symmetric encryption scheme [17, 19]. This impossibility only vanishes
if one accepts certain restrictions.
Another Impossibility Result: Key Cycles. As another example, consider a symbolic en-
cryption (symmetric or asymmetric) that allows to encrypt secret keys of the scheme itself.
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Such a technique can be used, e.g., for distributing an updated common secret key, or for
more sophisticated authentication schemes [32]. Now as long as no key cycles of the form
EK1(K2), EK2(K3), . . . , EKn−1(Kn), EKn(K1) appear, standard cryptographic security
notions, such as indistinguishability of ciphertexts under a chosen-ciphertext attack (IND-
CCA), are sufficient to prove security of a cryptographic implementation. However, in the
presence of key cycles, no standard reduction on, e.g., IND-CCA security works. This is no
accident, as IND-CCA security does not imply security in the presence of key-dependent
messages [33, 19]. In fact, it seems very hard to come up with cryptographic encryption
schemes that are provably secure even in face of key cycles. Currently, only solutions in the
random oracle model (a harsh abstraction from reality) are known [32, 33].
In other words, again security is only possible when certain conditions are met (namely,
that no key cycles appear).
More examples. There are a number of additional examples that illustrate the demand-
ing nature of particularly simulatable security. Very related to the commitment problem is
the impossibility of a simulatably secure protocol for the cryptographic task of bit com-
mitment [34]. Also, other important cryptographic tasks like zero-knowledge proof systems
and oblivious transfer [35], as well as authenticated Byzantine agreement [36] are shown (at
least unconditionally) not achievable with respect to simulatable security. The same holds
for whole classes of tasks (or, functionalities) that themselves fulfil certain game-based def-
initions [37]. In addition, also low-level tasks such as symbolic hash functions [38] or sym-
bolic XOR [39] are not (unconditionally) achievable.
Our Contribution: Conditional Simulatability. In this work, we propose a way to relax the
demanding simulatability definition without sacrificing its nice composability properties. In
a nutshell, we refine simulatability by restricting the class of allowed protocol environments
(in face of which real and ideal attack must be indistinguishable). More precisely, for a real
protocol M to be as secure as an ideal specification M ′, we demand that for every real
attack on M , there is an ideal attack on M ′, such that no protocol environment that fulfils a
condition π can distinguish between running with the real protocol and the real attack, and
running with the trusted host and the ideal attack.
Note that (in contrast to other approaches to circumvent impossibility results, see be-
low) we do not restrict the adversaries’ capabilities, but only the considered protocol envi-
ronments. The condition π we impose on the protocol environment is not fixed once and
for all. Hence, in contrast to the unconditional “at least as secure as” notation, we introduce
conditional simulatability and write that M is at least as secure as M ′ under condition π.
Conditional Simulatability implies Composability. When restricting our attention to proto-
col contexts that fulfil a certain condition π, we can of course only expect security if a larger
protocol, that uses M or M ′, satisfies π (when considered as a protocol environment). It is
immediate that this limits the compositional guarantees we obtain. However, this degrada-
tion of composability is graceful in the following sense: we prove that M can without loss
of security be substituted for M ′ in larger protocols that do satisfy π. Formally, we obtain
that for any larger protocol L that uses M ′ as a subprotocol and fulfils π, we have that the
protocol “L using M” is at least as secure as “L using M ′”. Interestingly, this security is
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unconditional, since we assumed that L fulfils π unconditionally. Hence, we re-obtain full,
unconditional security from conditional security under composition.
We also consider the case where the large protocolL only satisfies π if in turn some other
condition τ is fulfilled. (An easy example is a protocol L for secure message transmission
that uses as building block M ′ a trusted host for symmetric encryption. If L is never asked
to transmit a certain message, it can also guarantee that it never asks M ′ to encrypt this
message.) We prove the composition property one would expect in this situation; namely,
“L using M” is at least as secure as “L using M ′” under condition τ .
Technically, our composition theorem establishes a cryptographic statement on the
acyclic composition of general assume-guarantee specifications, i.e., specifications that
guarantee suitable behaviors only if they themselves are offered suitable guarantees.
Assume-guarantee specifications have been well investigated in the past, mostly for non-
security-specific contexts [40–43] but also specifically for security aspects [44] (but without
investigations of simulatability and composition). The postulation of acyclicity applies to
most cases in practice, e.g., to protocols that provide specific security guarantees to their
subprotocols without making these guarantees dependent on the outputs they obtain from
these subprotocols.
Interestingly, we can even prove compositionality for cyclic dependencies of such spec-
ifications, i.e., compositions of protocols that mutually promise to adhere to a certain behav-
ior only if they mutually receive guarantees from each other. This case is technically more
demanding since an inductive proof by proceeding through the acyclic dependency graph as
done in the proof of the acyclic case is no longer possible. In fact, it is easy to show that for
cyclic dependencies, subprotocols that are conditionally simulatable under arbitrary trace
properties might not be securely composable. However, we prove that the theorem for the
acyclic case can be carried over to the cyclic case if the constraints imposed on protocols
for conditional simulatability are safety properties. Safety properties arguably constitute the
most important class of properties for which conditional simulatability is used, especially
since liveness properties usually cannot be achieved unless one additionally constraints the
adversary to fair scheduling.
Our results are formalized in the Reactive Simulatability framework [13, 8, 10]. How-
ever, we do not use any specific characteristics of this framework, so our results can naturally
be carried over to other frameworks as well, e.g., those in [12, 15].
Applying our Results. We illustrate the usefulness of our definition and the (conditional)
composability guarantees that are retained by the above example of the commitment prob-
lem with symmetric encryption. We show that a secure real encryption system does im-
plement a symbolic Dolev-Yao-like symmetric encryption functionality under a suitable
no-commitment condition on the considered protocol environments.
We also demonstrate that in addition to circumventing known impossibility results for
unconditional simulatability, the notion of conditional simulatability may also allow for
securely realizing ideal functionalities at lower cost on the underlying cryptographic primi-
tives. For instance, if Dolev-Yao style symmetric encryption permits the construction of key
cycles, e.g., encrypting a key with itself, it is only securely realizable by encryption schemes
that fulfill certain strong, non-standard assumptions such as the aforementioned security in
presence of key-dependent messages. If, however, the functionality is conditioned to those
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cases that exclude key cycles, successful simulation of real attacks is possible based on
weaker, more standard security notions such as IND-CCA security.
Related Work. There have been several attempts to relax simulatability to avoid impossi-
bility results. The work closest to ours is the work on proving Dolev-Yao style symmetric
encryption sound in the sense of simulatability [17]. There it was shown that Dolev-Yao
style symmetric encryption can be securely realized if the environmental protocol does not
cause the commitment problem and in addition key cycles are excluded. This definition
thus constitutes a special case of conditional reactive simulatability yet without investigat-
ing more general conditions or corresponding compositionality aspects. Nevertheless, our
work is inspired by their idea of augmenting simulatability with conditions on environments.
The impossibility of simulating attacks on bit commitment schemes was shown in [34].
The remedy proposed there was to augment the real protocol with certain “helping trusted
hosts” which are, by definition, immune to any attack on the real protocol; thus, effectively
this weakens the real adversary. More specifically, [34] presented simulatably secure proto-
cols for bit commitment and zero-knowledge. However, these protocols rely on a so-called
Common Reference String (CRS), which is a form of a trusted setup assumption on the
protocol participants. In a similar vein, [16] shows that basically every trusted host can
be realized using a CRS as a helper functionality. One point of criticism against the CRS
approach is that the proposed protocols lose security in a formal and also very intuitive
sense as soon as the CRS setup assumption is invalidated. The related approach [45] uses a
Random Oracle (RO) instead of a CRS to help real protocols achieve simulatable security.
The benefit of their construction is that the proposed protocols retain at least classical (i.e.,
non-simulatable) security properties when the RO assumption is invalidated. However, also
there, simulatability in the original sense is lost as long as this happens.
In [46], the real and ideal adversaries are equipped with a so-called imaginary angel.
This is an oracle that (selectively) solves a certain class of hard computational problems for
the adversary. Under a very strong computational assumption, this notion could be shown
to avoid known impossibility results for simulatability. Yet, as the imaginary angels behave
in a very specific way tailored towards precisely circumventing these impossibility results,
e.g., these angels make their response dependent on the set of corrupted parties, the model
might be considered unintuitive. Tweaking the model to fit a specific proof technique addi-
tioally bears the danger of no longer capturing the intended properties and of complicating
a validation of the model.
In [47], it is shown how to realize any trusted host in a simulatable manner, if the ideal
adversary is freed from some of its computational restrictions. However, it is substantial
that in their security notion, the ideal adversary is not restricted to polynomial-time, but the
real adversary is. So in particular, the security notion they consider is not transitive and it is
generally not easy in their framework to construct larger protocols modularly.
Outline. We first review the underlying Reactive Simulatability framework in Section 2 and
subsequently define the more fine-grained version of conditional reactive simulatability in
Section 3. The bulk of the paper is dedicated to the investigation of the compositionality
aspects of this new security notion for both acyclic and cyclic assume-guarantee conditions
(Section 4). The usefulness of conditional reactive simulatability is further exemplified in
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Section 5 by showing how this notion can be exploited to cryptographically justify common
idealizations of cryptography. Section 6 concludes.
2 Review of the Reactive Simulatability Framework
Our work builds upon the Reactive Simulatability framework. We will briefly review rele-
vant definitions and refer the reader to [8] for details.
2.1 Overall Framework
A protocol is modeled as a structure (M,S) consisting of a set of protocol machines and
a set of service ports, to which the protocol user connects1. Machines are probabilistic,
polynomial-time I/O automata, and are connected by ports. The model differentiates in-
ports and out-ports, where each out-port is connected to exactly one in-port by naming
convention. Moreover, in- and out-ports may be service or non-service ports. In what fol-
lows, by Sin we denote the service in-ports of S and by SC,out the complement of M ’s
service out-ports, i.e., the set of service in-ports of machines M connects to.
Two structures (M1, S1) and (M2, S2) are composable iff they connect through their
respective service ports only. Their composition is given by (M1∪M2, S) where S includes
all ports from S1 and S2 that are not connected to another machine in M1 ∪M2.
A set of machines M is closed iff all ports are connected to corresponding ports of
machines that are in the same set. A structure can be complemented to a closed set by
a so-called honest user H and an adversary A, where H connects to service ports only,
and A connects to all remaining open ports, and both machines may interact. The tuple
(M,S,H,A) is then called a configuration of (M,S) where one of the machines H or A
plays the role of the master scheduler, i.e., if no machine was activated by receiving a mes-
sage, the master schedule is activated. A closed set C of machines constitutes a runnable
system. The transcript of a single run is called a trace (often denoted by t and decorations
thereof) and is defined to be a sequence of transitions performed by the machines. A tran-
sition of a machine M is of the form (p, s, s′, p′) where p describes the in-ports of M along
with the current message written on these ports, s is the current configuration of M , s′ is
a successor configuration (computed depending on p and s), and p′ are the out-ports along
with the output produced. We denote by runC,k the distribution of traces induced by runs
of C with security parameter k. The restriction t⌈S of a trace t to a set of in-ports S is
defined in the obvious way. (Note that t⌈S only depends on the first component (p) of the
transitions of t). Now, runC,k⌈S denotes the distribution of the traces induced by runs of C
with security parameter k when restricted to S. The restriction of a trace t to a machine M
is obtained from t by removing all transitions not done by M. Now, the distribution of such
traces given k is denoted by viewC,k(M). We refer to the k-indexed family {viewC,k(M)}k
of these views by viewC(M).
1 Actually, a structure represents a protocol in a specific corruption situation. To handle different
corruption situations, systems (i.e., sets of structures) are used. However, in the style of [8, 48], we
concentrate on a given specific corruption situation for ease of presentation.
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Fig. 2. Simulatability: The two views of H must be indistinguishable
2.2 Simulatability
Simulatability is used in different areas of cryptography. Informally speaking, for reactive
systems it says that whatever might happen to a protocol (M,S) can also happen to another
protocol (M ′, S). Here both protocols need to have the same set of service ports S to allow
for a meaningful comparison. Typically, (M ′, S) is an idealization, or specification, of the
protocol task that (M,S) is to implement. We therefore call (M,S) the real and (M ′, S) the
ideal protocol. (Typically, the ideal protocol consists only of a single machine TH, a trusted
host, that guarantees an ideal behaviour to a user of the protocol.) For simulatability one
requires that for every configuration (M,S,H,A), with honest user H and real adversary
A, there is a configuration (M ′, S,H,A′) of (M ′, S), with the same honest user H and a
(possibly different) ideal adversary A′, such that H cannot distinguish both scenarios. This
is illustrated in Figure 2.
We define “H cannot distinguish both scenarios” in terms of computational indistin-
guishability: Two families (vark)k∈N, (var′k)k∈N of random variables on common domains
Dk are computationally indistinguishable (“≈”) if no polynomial-time algorithm can dis-
tinguish both distributions with non-negligible probability, i.e., if for all polynomial-time
algorithms Dis the following holds:
∣∣Pr [Dis(1k, vark) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Dis(1k, vark) = 1
]∣∣ is negligible in k,
where a function g : N → R≥0 is said to be negligible iff for all positive polynomials Q,
∃k0∀k ≥ k0 : g(k) ≤ 1/Q(k).
Definition 1 (Reactive Simulatability). Let structures (M,S) and (M ′, S) with identical
sets of service ports be given. We write (M,S) ≥polysec (M ′, S), where ≥polysec is read as
computationally at least as secure as or securely realizes, if for every configuration conf =
(M,S,H,A), there exists a configuration conf ′ = (M ′, S,H,A′) (with the same H) such
that
view conf (H) ≈ view conf ′(H).
✸
One also defines universal simulatability, where A′ in conf ′ does not depend on H, i.e., the
order of quantifiers is reversed, and blackbox simulatability, where A′ is the composition of
a fixed part Sim (the simulator) and A. In the sequel, we omit the superscript poly.
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3 Conditional Reactive Simulatability
Reactive simulatability (Definition 1) permits configurations with arbitrary honest users H
(satisfying some syntactic requirements on ports). In other words, reactive simulatability
requires a faithful simulation of the combination of the real adversary and real protocol by
the ideal adversary and ideal protocol for every honest user. This universal quantification
over all honest users allows for a general composition theorem [13, 14], which says that if
protocol (M,S) is as secure as protocol (M ′, S), then (M,S) can be substituted for (M ′, S)
in any larger protocol without invalidating simulatability. For this type of compositional
property, simulatability can even be shown to be necessary [49].
However, reactive simulatability may be too strict in certain practical scenarios: The
simulation might fail for certain honest users, but in the application under consideration such
users may not occur since the protocol in question may always be used in a certain (secure)
way. For example, consider Dolev-Yao style symmetric encryption. It was shown in [17] that
this kind of encryption is not securely realizable in the sense of reactive simulatability, due to
the so-called commitment problem: If an encrypted message is sent to the adversary, where
the adversary neither knows the message nor the key, the best the simulator can do is to
create a new key and encrypt a random message with this key. If later the message becomes
known, indistinguishability guarantees that the simulation is still correct. However, if later
the key becomes known, the simulator has to come up with a suitable key that decrypts the
chosen ciphertext to the correct message. This is not possible in general. However, in the
application under consideration the way Dolev-Yao style symmetric encryption is used, e.g.,
by a larger protocol (representing the honest user), may guarantee that the encryption key is
never exposed. It turns out that in this situation faithful simulation is still possible.
Following this idea, we propose a relaxation of reactive simulatability, called conditional
reactive simulatability, where instead of quantifying over all honest users, we quantify only
over those honest users which satisfy a certain condition. In this way awkward honest users
which would not occur in the application anyway can be ruled out.
The conditions on honest users are expressed in terms of what we call predicates. A
predicate, which is defined with respect to a set S of ports (typically service in-ports), is
a set of sequences of bit strings for every port of S. Using predicates, we can restrict the
kind and the order of messages on ports of S in a run of a system. To formally define these
predicates, we need the following notation: For sets A and B, we denote by BA the set of
mappings from A to B. If A is a finite set, then the elements of BA can be considered to be
tuples where every component is an element of B and corresponds to an element of A. For
i ≥ 0 and a set A, we denote by Ai the set of all words over A of length i. Now, predicates
are defined as follows:
Definition 2 (Predicates). Let S be a set of ports. We call a set π with
π ⊆
⋃
i≥0
(({0, 1}∗)S)i
a predicate π over S if the following conditions are satisfied:
1. If s1 · · · si ∈ π, sj ∈ ({0, 1}∗)S , then for every j ∈ {1, . . . , i} there exists p ∈ S such
that sj(p) 6= ε, i.e., for every sj at least one port contains a non-empty message.
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2. π is decidable in polynomial-time, i.e., there is a probabilistic polynomial-time algo-
rithm that, on input t, outputs whether or not t ∈ π.
We call t ∈ π an S-trace. ✸
Instead of a single predicate, one could also consider a family of predicates indexed by the
security parameter. However, for the application presented in this paper, simple predicates
suffice. Also, all results presented in this paper easily carry over to the case of families of
predicates.
We will use the following notation. We write π = true for a predicate π over S with
π =
⋃
i≥0(({0, 1}
∗)S)i. Furthermore, for two predicates π1 and π2 over two disjoint port
sets S1 and S2, we write π1 ∧ π2 for the predicate containing all (S1 ∪ S2)-traces such that
for every trace in π1 ∧ π2 its restriction to S1 and S2 belongs to π1 and π2, respectively.
(In a run restricted to some port set S, all entries with non-empty bit strings only on non-S
ports are deleted.) Intuitively, π1 ∧ π2 represents the conjunction of π1 and π2.
An S-trace t′ is a prefix of an S-trace t if there exist t′′ such that t = t′ · t′′ where ‘·’
denotes concatenation. A predicate π over S is prefix-closed iff for every S-trace t ∈ π
every prefix of t belongs to π as well. We also call such a predicate a safety property since
once it is violated it stays violated.
Now, we say that a set of machines M fulfills a predicate π over a set of ports S, if in
runs of M with any other set of machines the sequences of messages written on ports in S
belong to π. More precisely, it suffices if this is true with overwhelming probability:
Definition 3 (Predicate Fulfillment). Let M be a set of machines with service ports S and
let π be a predicate over a subset S′ of the ports SC,out of machines to which machines in
M connect. Then, M fulfills π if for any set of machines M such that C := {M,M} is
closed,
Prt←runC,k [(t⌈S′) ∈ π] is overwhelming as a function in k.
✸
We are now ready to present the definition of conditional reactive simulatability.
Definition 4 (Conditional Reactive Simulatability). Let structures (M,S) and (M ′, S)
with identical set S of service ports be given, and let π be a predicate over a subset of the
service in-ports of S. We say that (M,S) is at least as secure as (or realizes) (M ′, S) under
condition π (written (M,S) ≥πsec (M ′, S)) if for every configuration conf = (M,S,H,A)
such that H fulfills π, there exists a configuration conf ′ = (M ′, S,H,A′) (with the same H)
such that
view conf (H) ≈ view conf ′(H).
✸
Conditional universal simulatability and conditional blackbox simulatability are defined
with the obvious modifications.
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4 Composition Under Conditional Reactive Simulatability
In this section, we present composition theorems for conditional reactive simulatability. As
mentioned in the introduction, when composing protocols which assume certain conditions
(predicates) to hold on their service in-ports and in turn guarantee certain conditions (predi-
cates) to hold on service in-ports of other protocols, cyclic dependencies may occur. In what
follows, we first introduce the general setting (Section 4.1) and then present general com-
position theorems both for the acyclic and cyclic case (Section 4.2 and 4.3). While for the
acyclic case no restrictions on predicates are put, for the cyclic case we require predicates
to be safety properties.
4.1 The General Setting
One would expect that a protocol M0 (for brevity we omit the service ports) that is simu-
latable under condition π can be securely composed with a higher-level protocol M1 that
fulfills π. In some applications, M1 may fulfill π only if M1 itself is used in a certain way,
i.e., a predicate, say τ , is fulfilled on the service in-ports ofM1. Then, one would expect that
M0 securely composes with M1 as long as τ is fulfilled. More generally, we consider the
composition of several protocols with assume-guarantee conditions among them. In what
follows, this is formalized.
Let π and τ be predicates over Sπ and Sτ , respectively, and let t be a trace. We say that
t satisfies τ → π if t⌈Sτ∈ τ implies t⌈Spi∈ π.
Definition 5 (Conditional Predicate Fulfillment). LetM be a set of machines with service
ports S, τ be a predicate over a subset Sτ of Sin, and π be a predicate over a subset Sπ of
SC,out. (Recall the definition of Sin and SC,out from Section 2.)
Then,M fulfills π under condition τ if τ → π is satisfied with overwhelming probability
no matter with which machines M interacts, i.e., for all sets M of machines such that
C := {M,M} is closed, we have that
Prt←runC,k [t satisfies τ → π] is overwhelming as a function in k.
✸
In what follows, for every i = 1, . . . , n, let Pi := (Mi, Si) and P ′i := (M ′i , Si) be real and
ideal protocols, respectively. We consider the following predicates for these protocols.
Let τ ji be a predicate over S
C,out
j ∩S
in
i (service in-ports of Pi to which Pj connects) and
τHi be a predicate over Sini \
⋃n
j=1 S
C,out
j (service in-ports of Pi to which no other protocol
connects). Intuitively, τ ji denotes the guarantees the ith protocol expects from the jth one.
Analogously, τHi specifies the guarantees the ith protocol expects from H. (Note that H may
connect to all service in-ports of Pi the other protocols do not connect to.) We denote by
τi = τ
H
i ∧
∧
j 6=i
τ ji (1)
the guarantees the ith protocol expects from other protocols. Note that τi is a predicate over
Sini .
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Similarly, we now define the guarantees the ith protocol provides to other protocols. Let
πji be a predicate over S
C,out
i ∩S
in
j (service in-ports of Pj to which Pi connects). Intuitively,
πji denotes the guarantees the ith protocol gives to the jth one. Note that we do not consider
a predicate πHi . This simplifies our presentation and is without loss of generality since we
are only interested in the compositionality properties of the composed protocol. We denote
by
πi =
∧
j 6=i
πji . (2)
the guarantees the ith protocol provides to other protocols. Note that πi is a predicate over⋃
j 6=i(S
C,out
i ∩ S
in
j ).
In order for the composition theorems to hold, we clearly need that
πij ⊆ τ
j
i , (3)
i.e., the guarantees τ ji the ith protocol expects from the jth one are actually met by the
guarantees πij the jth protocol offers to the ith protocol.
Obviously, in the setting above the guarantees among the protocols may be cyclic: the
ith protocol provides guaranteeπji (and hence, τ ij ) to the jth protocol only if the jth protocol
guarantees τ ji , and vice versa, i.e., the jth protocol provides guarantee πij (and hence, τ ji )
to the ith protocol only if the ith protocol guarantees τ ij . Hence, in case τ ij 6= true and
τ ji 6= true the dependencies between the ith and jth protocol are cyclic. The following is a
concrete example.
Example 1. Say that an encryption system P1 guarantees that the secret key is not output in
plain as long as this secret key is not submitted as part of a plaintext for encryption. However,
a higher-level protocol P2 that uses that encryption system might want to encrypt plaintexts
multiple times, possibly tagged with some syntactic type information. In particular, as long
as the secret key in plain is not part of the plaintext of any ciphertext, this secret key will
not be submitted for encryption. In other words, there is a mutual dependency between P1
and P2. (Obviously, in this particular case secure composition is possible.)
More generally, cyclic dependencies are defined as follows: Let the (directed) dependency
graph G = (V,E) be given by
V = {V1, . . . , Vn}, E = {(Vi, Vj) : τ
j
i 6= true}. (4)
If G is acyclic, we say that the dependencies between the protocols are acyclic or non-
mutual, and otherwise, we say that they are cyclic or mutual.
In the following two subsections, we prove theorems for securely composing protocols,
both in the case of acyclic and cyclic dependencies between the protocols. In these theo-
rems we need to argue that the condition τi the ith protocol expects to be satisfied are in
fact fulfilled when composing all protocols. In case of acyclic dependencies between the
protocols, this is possible because the fulfillment of τi can be traced back to the conditions
satisfied by other protocols or the honest users. In case of cyclic dependencies this is in
general not possible because one runs into cycles. However, as we will see, if the predi-
cates involved are safety properties, cyclic dependencies can be resolved. We note that the
predicates informally stated in Example 1 are in fact safety predicates.
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4.2 Composition in the Acyclic Case
In this section, we prove the following general composition theorem for the case of acyclic
dependencies between the protocols.
Theorem 1. For every i = 1, . . . , n, let Pi = (Mi, Si) and P ′i = (M ′i , Si) be protocols as
introduced above with Pi ≥τisec P ′i , and assume that M ′i fulfills πi under condition τi where
πi and τi are defined as above and condition (3) is satisfied. If the dependencies between
the protocols are acyclic, we have, for every i, that
P1|| . . . ||Pn ≥
τ
sec P1|| . . . ||Pi−1||P
′
i ||Pi+1|| . . . ||Pn, (5)
where τ :=
∧n
j=1 τ
H
j . Moreover,
P1|| . . . ||Pn ≥
τ
sec P
′
1|| . . . ||P
′
n. (6)
✷
Before we prove this theorem, we present useful corollaries of this theorem. The first corol-
lary considers the case of two protocols and it easily follows from Theorem 1 using that
P2 ≥sec P2.
Corollary 1 (Conditional Subroutine Composition). Assume that P1 ≥πsec P ′1. Let P2 =
(M2, S2) be a protocol such that M2 i) connects to all ports over which π is defined and ii)
fulfills π under condition τ where τ is a predicate over the service in-ports of P2 to which
P1 does not connect. Then,
P1||P2 ≥
τ
sec P
′
1||P2.
If τ = true, i.e., M2 fulfills π unconditionally, we obtain
P1||P2 ≥sec P
′
1||P2.
✷
Theorem 1 also allows to combine two protocols that are not connected via service ports:
Corollary 2 (Parallel Composition). Assume that P1 ≥π1sec P ′1 and P2 ≥π2sec P2 such that
P1 and P2 are not connected via service ports. Then,
P1||P2 ≥
π1∧π2
sec P
′
1||P
′
2.
✷
Proof of Theorem 1. The proof relies on the following definition:
Definition 6. Let M, τ, π be as in Definition 5. Then, M fulfills π under enforced condition
τ if the predicate π is true with overwhelming probability when M interacts with machines
that fulfill τ , i.e., for all sets M of machines that fulfill τ and such that C := {M,M} is
closed, it holds that
Prt←runC,k [t satisfies π] is overwhelming as a function in k.
✸
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Obviously, if M fulfills π under condition τ , then M fulfills π under enforced condition τ .
As a preparation for our proof, note that for i = 1, . . . , n, both M ′i and Mi fulfill πi
under enforced condition τi. For M ′i , this is clear by assumption, and for Mi it follows from
Mi ≥τsec M
′
i . (Assuming that it is not true for Mi, one obtains an honest user which cannot
be simulated, contradicting the assumption that Mi ≥τsec M ′i .) Now fix i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and
set
P˜i := P1|| . . . ||Pn and P˜ ′i := P1|| . . . ||Pi−1||P ′i ||Pi+1|| . . . ||Pn.
Theorem statement (5): We need to show that for every configuration conf = (P˜i,H,A) of
P˜i, where H fulfills τ , there is a valid configuration conf ′ = (P˜ ′i ,H,A′) of P˜ ′i with the same
H such that
view conf (H) ≈ view conf ′(H). (7)
Step 1: We construct a new user Hi as a combination of H with all protocol machines Mj
except for Mi. Note that Hi is polynomial-time, so in any case, conf i := (Pi,Hi,A) is a
configuration of Pi.
Hi fulfills τi: Note that this statement makes sense because Hi connects to all ofMi’s service
ports. The somewhat technical proof is postponed to the appendix (Lemma 2). In this proof
we use that Mi fulfills πi under enforced condition τi.
Step 2: Now, since Hi fulfills τi, the conditional simulatability of Mi guarantees the exis-
tence of a configuration conf ′i := (P ′i ,Hi,A′) with
view conf i(Hi) ≈ view conf ′i(Hi).
In particular, this yields
view conf i(H) ≈ view conf ′i(H) (8)
for the submachine H of Hi.
Step 3: Decomposing Hi into H and the machines Mj (j 6= i) yields a valid configuration
(P˜ ′i ,H,A
′) of protocol P˜ ′i such that (7) follows from (8) as desired.
Theorem statement (6): We show
P ′1|| . . . ||P
′
i−1||Pi . . . ||Pn ≥
τ
sec P
′
1|| . . . ||P
′
i ||Pi+1 . . . ||Pn (9)
for i = 1, . . . , n by repeatedly applying (5). The case i = 1 is directly implied by (5), and
for i > 1, all Pj with j < i can be set to P ′j . Then by transitivity, (9) implies (6), which
completes the proof.
4.3 Dealing with Mutual Dependencies – Composition in the Cyclic Case
In this section, we show that protocols can securely be composed even in case of cyclic
dependencies given that the predicates considered are safety properties.
Theorem 2. For every i = 1, . . . , n, let Pi = (Mi, Si) and P ′i = (M ′i , Si) be protocols
as introduced in Section 4.1 with Pi ≥τisec P ′i , and assume that M ′i and Mi fulfill πi under
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condition τi where πi and τi are defined as in Section 4.1 and condition (3) is satisfied. Also,
assume that all predicates τ ji , τHi , and π
j
i are safety properties. Then, for all i, we have:
P1|| . . . ||Pn ≥
τ
sec P1|| . . . ||Pi−1||P
′
i ||Pi+1|| . . . ||Pn, (10)
where τ :=
∧n
j=1 τ
H
j . Moreover,
P1|| . . . ||Pn ≥
τ
sec P
′
1|| . . . ||P
′
n. (11)
✷
We note that in Theorem 2 the requirement that Mi fulfills πi under condition τi can be
dispensed with if service out-ports are scheduled locally (which in most scenarios is the
case): The reason is that, as in the proof of Theorem 1, it easily follows that if M ′i fulfills
πi under condition τi, then Mi fulfills πi under enforced condition τi. Now, it is not hard to
see that if service out-ports are scheduled locally, then the notion of Definition 6 implies the
one of Definition 5. Hence, Mi fulfills πi under condition τi.
Proof of Theorem 2. For the proof of Theorem 2, we need some terminology. For a trace t
and predicates τ and π such that τ and π are safety properties, we say that t satisfies τ → π
at any time if t′ satisfies τ → π for every prefix t′ of t.
Definition 7. LetM,π, τ be as in Definition 5 such that π and τ are safety properties. Then,
M fulfills π under condition τ at any time if the predicate τ → π is satisfied at any time
with overwhelming probability, no matter with which machines M interacts, i.e., for all sets
M such that C := {M,M} is closed, it holds that
Prt←runC,k [t satisfies τ → π at any time] is overwhelming as a function in k. (12)
✸
We can show that the above notion is equivalent to the one defined in Definition 5.
Lemma 1. Let M , π, and τ be as in Definition 7, and such that M contains no master
scheduler. Then we have that M fulfills π under condition τ at any time iff M fulfills π
under condition τ . ✷
Proof. The direction from left to right easily follows from the fact that if a trace t satisfies
τ → π at any time, then t satisfies τ → π.
To see the converse direction, let M be a set of machines such that C = {M,M}
is closed and let the polynomial p(k) bound the runtime of M . (Note that M necessarily
contains a master scheduler.) First, by definition, if a trace t of C does not satisfy τ → π at
any time, then there exists a prefix t′ of t which does not satisfy τ → π, i.e., t′⌈Sτ∈ τ but
t′⌈Spi /∈ π. Let t′ be of minimal length with this property.
We claim (*): The last transition of t′ must be a transition of M . This claim is easy to
see. Assume that the last transition of t′ is a transition of M . Let t′′ be obtained from t′
by removing the last transition. We have that t′⌈Sτ∈ τ and t′⌈Spi /∈ π. Since τ is a safety
property it follows that t′′⌈Sτ∈ τ . Since the last transition of t′ does not contain ports in Sπ
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Fig. 3. Overview of the proof of Theorem 2.
(since Sπ only contains in-ports of M ), we obtain that t′⌈Spi= t′′⌈Spi . Hence, t′′⌈Spi /∈ π. But
this means that t′′ does not satisfy τ → π, in contradiction to the minimality of t′.
Now, assume that (12) is not satisfied, i.e., Prt←runC,k [E′(k)], where E′(k) is the
event that t does not satisfy τ → π at any time, is a non-negligible function in k. Consider
the machine M∗ which simulates M but at the beginning randomly chooses a position
i ∈ {1, . . . , p(k) + 1} and when activated for the ith time it stops (simulating M ).
Let C∗ = {M,M∗}. We show that Prt←runC∗,k [E(k)] is a non-negligible function in k,
where E(k) is the event “t does not satisfy τ → π”. From this the lemma follows. Let
“M∗(i = j)” denote the event that in a run of C∗, M∗ picks i to be j. Then, we have that
Prt←runC∗,k [E(k)] =
p(k)+1∑
j=1
Prt←runC∗,k [E(k) |M
∗(i = j))] · Prt←runC∗,k [M
∗(i = j)]
=
1
p(k) + 1
·
p(k)+1∑
j=1
Prt←runC∗,k [E(k) |M
∗(i = j))]
=
1
p(k) + 1
· Prt←runC,k [E
′(k)]
where in the last equation we use that by (*) we have that Prt←runC,k [E′(k)] =∑p(k)+1
j=1 Prt←runC,k
[
t does not satisfy τ → π and M performs i transitions
]
. Now, since
Prt←runC,k [E
′(k)] is non-negligible, so is Prt←runC∗,k [E(k)].
We can now prove Theorem 2. For an overview of the proof, see Figure 3. We first prove
(10), from which then (11) follows as in the proof of Theorem 1. Fix i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and set
P˜i := P1|| . . . ||Pn and P˜ ′i := P1|| . . . ||Pi−1||P ′i ||Pi+1|| . . . ||Pn.
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We need to show that for every configuration conf = (P˜i,H,A) of P˜i, where H fulfills τ ,
there is a valid configuration conf ′ = (P˜ ′i ,H,A′) of P˜ ′i with the same H, such that
view conf (H) ≈ view conf ′(H). (13)
Step 1: We construct a new user Hi as a combination of H with all protocol machines Mj
except for Mi. Note that Hi is polynomial-time, so in any case, conf i := (Pi,Hi,A) is a
configuration of Pi.
Step 2: We modifyHi into a new user H∗i such that H∗i fulfills τi. This is done by substituting
all sets of submachinesMj (j 6= i) of Hi by sets of machinesM∗j that fulfill their respective
predicates πj without any preconditions. More specifically, M∗j simulates Mj and in addi-
tion checks whether τj is fulfilled, i.e., whether the observed sequence of inputs on in-ports
of Mj lies in τj . By assumption, this can be done efficiently. If τj is not fulfilled, then M∗j
halts immediately.
First claim regarding H∗i : We claim that the view of the submachine H of Hi is not changed
(non-negligibly) by this modification, i.e., we claim
view conf i(H) ≈ view conf ∗i (H) (14)
where conf ∗i = (Pi,H∗i ,A).
Assume for contradiction that (14) does not hold. Then the probability that some τj
(j 6= i) is not fulfilled in a run of conf i is non-negligible (since otherwise, conf i and conf ∗i
behave identical). Let j be such that τj is with non-negligible probability the first of all
predicates τℓ (1 ≤ ℓ ≤ n) to become false in a run of conf i. By “first”, we mean that there
is a prefix of the considered run that does not lie in τj , but all shorter prefixes lie in all τℓ.
(Note that by the prefix-closeness of all τℓ such a prefix must exist for some j.)
Because of (1), there is thus a τrj (with r ∈ {1, . . . , n,H} \ {j}) such that with non-
negligible probability, τrj becomes false before any other predicate τℓ, ℓ 6= j, and τr
′
j ,
r′ 6= r, does. As r = H directly contradicts the assumption on H, we may assume r 6= H.
Now by assumption, Mr fulfills πr, and thus, by (3) and (1), also τrj under condition
τr (in the sense of Definition 5). By Lemma 1 and the just derived statement about τrj , this
implies that with non-negligible probability, τr is false before τj is. This is a contradiction
to the choice of j.
Second claim regarding H∗i : We claim that H∗i fulfills τi (without any precondition). By (1)
and the assumption on H, it suffices to prove that for any j 6= i, M∗j fulfills τ
j
i without
any precondition. Now since Mj fulfills πj under condition τj , it also does so at any time
(Lemma 1). That is, it holds with overwhelming probability that at any point during a run
of Mj , πj is true unless τj becomes false.
By construction, M∗j and Mj behave identically unless τj becomes false. That is, also
M∗j fulfills πj under condition τj at any time. In particular, by definition of M∗j , with over-
whelming probability πj is true when M∗j halts. It is also easy to see that πj cannot become
false after M∗j has halted. Hence, M∗j fulfills πj , and thus, τ
j
i unconditionally.
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Step 3: As H∗i fulfills τi, the conditional simulatability of Mi guarantees the existence of a
configuration conf ∗i ′ := (P ′i ,H∗i ,A′) with
viewconf ∗
i
(H∗i ) ≈ view conf ∗i ′(H
∗
i ).
In particular, this yields
view conf ∗
i
(H) ≈ view conf ∗
i
′(H) (15)
for the submachine H of H∗i .
Step 4: We substitute H∗i again by Hi. Since, by assumption, M ′i fulfills πi under condition
τi, analogously to Step 2 we can show that
view conf ∗
i
′(H) ≈ view conf ′
i
(H) (16)
where conf ′i = (P ′i ,Hi,A′).
Step 5: Decomposing Hi into H and the machines Mj (j 6= i) yields a valid configuration
(P˜ ′i ,H,A
′) of protocol P˜ ′i such that (13) and thus (10) follows from (14), (15) and (16) as
desired.
5 Applications and Examples
In this section, we provide examples substantiating the claim that conditional reactive sim-
ulatability constitutes a suitable security notion for circumventing known impossibility re-
sults of simulating interesting abstractions of cryptography. In addition, we illustrate that
imposing suitable constraints on the environment may allow for a simulation proof based
on much weaker assumptions on the underlying cryptography. Generally speaking, condi-
tional reactive simulatability allows for exploiting knowledge of which protocol class will
use the protocol under investigation, resulting in more fine-grained reasoning about crypto-
graphic protocols.
More specifically, we prove that Dolev-Yao style abstractions of symmetric encryption
can be correctly simulated by conditioning environments to those cases that do not cause
a so-called commitment problem. For unconditional simulatability, Dolev-Yao style sym-
metric encryption is known not to be simulatable at all [17]. If one further constrains the
environment not to create key cycles, e.g., encrypting a key with itself, we can even estab-
lish conditional simulatability based on considerably weaker assumptions on the underlying
cryptographic encryption scheme. Finally, we show that conditional simulatability may nat-
urally entail unconditional simulatability for composed protocols again.
5.1 Conditional Simulatability of Dolev-Yao Style Symmetric Encryption
For Dolev-Yao style symmetric encryption, the following so-called commitment problem
inherently prevents the successful application of unconditional reactive simulatability. The
ideal encryption system must somehow allow that secret keys are sent from one participant
to another. This is used for example in key-exchange protocols. If the ideal system simply
allows keys to be sent at any time (and typical Dolev-Yao models do allow all valid terms
to be sent at any time), the following problem can occur: An honest participant first sends a
ciphertext such that the adversary can see it, and later sends both the contained plaintext and
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the key. This behavior may even be reasonably designed into protocols, e.g., the ciphertext
might be an encrypted bet that is later opened. The simulator will first learn in some abstract
way that a ciphertext was sent and has to simulate it by some bitstring, which the adversary
sees. Later the simulator sees abstractly that a key becomes known and that the ciphertext
contains a specific application message. It cannot change the application message, thus it
must simulate a key that decrypts the old ciphertext bitstring (produced without knowledge
of the application message) to this specific message.
We omit a rigorous definition of the absence of the commitment problem for Dolev-Yao
style symmetric encryption as given in [17, 19] but only give an informal definition for the
sake of readability:
Definition 8 (No Commitment Property of Dolev-Yao Style Symmetric Encryption, in-
formally). The No Commitment propertyNoComm of Dolev-Yao style symmetric encryption
consists of those traces of Dolev-Yao style symmetric encryption that satisfy the following
trace predicate: If a term is encrypted at time t1 in this trace by an honest user u with secret
key sk , and at this time sk is not known to the adversary, then the adversary does not learn
the key sk at any future time t2 in this trace. ✸
Technically, the requirement that an adversary does not learn certain keys relies on the state
of the Dolev-Yao model which keeps track of who knows which term; thus Definition 8 is
syntactically not a predicate in the sense of Definition 2. However, those parts of the state
that capture if an adversary already knows keys generated by honest users are uniquely
determined by the preceding inputs at the service in-ports. Thus NoComm can naturally be
recast as a property that is only defined at the service in-ports of the Dolev-Yao model and
thus as a predicate in the sense of Definition 2 (however with a much more tedious notation).
The main result of [19] provides a simulation for those cases in which NoComm is
fulfilled provided that the cryptographic encryption scheme fulfills the notion of dynamic
KDM security [19]. We can now rephrase their result in our formalism to benefit from the
compositionality guarantees entailed by our composition theorems. In the following, let
({THcry_sym,idH }, SH) and ({M
cry_sym,real
E,u | u ∈ H}, SH) denote the Dolev-Yao model of
symmetric encryption and its cryptographic realization from [17, 19], respectively, for a set
H ⊆ {1, . . . , n} of honest users, and an encryption scheme E .
Theorem 3 (Conditional Reactive Simulatability of Dolev-Yao Style Symmetric En-
cryption). For all symmetric encryption schemes E that satisfy dynamic KDM security [19],
and for all sets H ⊆ {1, . . . , n} of honest users, the realization of the Dolev-Yao model is at
least as secure as the Dolev-Yao model under condition NoComm, i.e., ({Mcry_sym,realE,u | u ∈
H}, SH) ≥NoCommsec ({TH
cry_sym,id
H }, SH). ✷
5.2 Securely Realizing Dolev-Yao Style Symmetric Encryption with Weaker
Cryptography
While Theorem 3 shows that Dolev-Yao style symmetric encryption can be conditionally
simulated by excluding the commitment property, it still relies on the strong assumption that
the underlying encryption scheme satisfies dynamic KDM security – a very strong, non-
standard notion for which no realization in the standard model of cryptography is known.
However, it turns out that this strong notion is only necessary to deal with the quite exotic
case that symmetric keys are encrypted in a cyclic manner, e.g., a key with itself. Most
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protocols however avoid such constructions by definition, and indeed further constraining
simulatability to traces that do not contain key cycles yields a simulatability result based
on considerably weaker assumptions on the underlying encryption scheme. More precisely,
it suffices that the encryption scheme satisfies indistinguishability under adaptive chosen-
ciphertext attacks as well as integrity of ciphertexts. This is the standard security defini-
tion of authenticated symmetric encryption [50, 51], and efficient symmetric encryptions
schemes provably secure in this sense exist under reasonable assumptions [52, 53].
Definition 9 (No Key Cycles for Dolev-Yao Style Symmetric Encryption, informally).
The No Key Cycles property NoKeyCycles of Dolev-Yao style symmetric encryption consists
of those traces of Dolev-Yao style symmetric encryption in which honest users do not create
encryptions E(ski,mi) such that ski+1 is a subterm of mi for i = 0, . . . , j − 1 for some j,
and sk0 is a subterm of mj . ✸
Theorem 4 (Conditional Reactive Simulatability of Dolev-Yao Style Symmetric En-
cryption w/o Key Cycles). For all authenticated symmetric encryption schemes E and
all sets H ⊆ {1, . . . , n} of honest users, the realization of the Dolev-Yao model is at
least as secure as the Dolev-Yao model under condition NoComm ∧ NoKeyCycles, i.e.,
({Mcry_sym,realE,u | u ∈ H}, SH) ≥
NoComm∧NoKeyCycles
sec ({TH
cry_sym,id
H }, SH). ✷
5.3 Simulatable Protocols from Conditionally Simulatable Subprotocols
We finally illustrate, exploiting Corollary 1, that conditional simulatability can often be
turned into unconditional simulatability again (and in fact, it seems hard to come up with a
non-artificial example for which Corollary 1 does not apply). Consider a secure channel be-
tween two parties that uses Dolev-Yao style symmetric encryption as a subprimitive, which
itself is only conditionally simulatable. The secure channel consists of two machines M1
and M2. M1 expects a message m as input at a service port in?, and encrypts this message
with a symmetric key k shared with M2. The encryption is computed using Dolev-Yao style
symmetric encryption as a subprimitive, i.e., m is output at a service port enc_out1! and the
resulting encryption e is obtained at a service port enc_in1?. M2 outputs the message at a
service port out!. We do not give a rigorous definition of this behavior here since this would
presuppose introducing a significant amount of notion from [17] but it should be clear al-
ready that this secure channel neither causes a commitment problem nor any key cycles by
construction. Let (M sc, Ssc) := ({M1,M2}, {in?, out!, enc_out1!, enc_in1?}) denote the
secure channel.
Theorem 5. For all authenticated symmetric encryption schemes E , and for H = {1, 2},
the secure channel based on the realization is unconditionally at least as secure as the secure
channel based on the Dolev-Yao model, i.e., (M sc, Ssc)||({Mcry_sym,realE,u | u ∈ H}, SH) ≥sec
(M sc, Ssc)||({THcry_sym,idH }, SH). ✷
6 Conclusion
We presented a relaxation of simulatability, one of the central concepts of modern cryptog-
raphy for defining and analyzing the security of multi-party protocols, by permitting to con-
strain environments to adhere to certain behaviors. The resulting notion is called conditional
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reactive simulatability. It constitutes a more fine-grained security notion that is achievable
i) for protocols for which traditional simulatability is too strong a notion, and ii) based on
weaker requirements on the underlying cryptography. In addition, conditional reactive sim-
ulatability maintains the interesting property that for various protocol classes, composition
of conditionally simulatable protocols yield protocols that are simulatable in the traditional
sense.
We furthermore showed that despite imposing restrictions on the surrounding protocol
and thus giving up the universal quantification of environments that naturally allowed for
compositionality proofs in earlier works, the notion of conditional reactive simulatability
still entails strong compositionality guarantees. In particular, this holds for the common case
of composing so-called assume-guarantee specifications, i.e., specifications that are known
to behave properly if offered suitable inputs, provided that these assumptions and guarantees
constitute arbitrary trace properties that do not give rise to cyclic dependencies. We further
investigated the theoretically more demanding (but arguably practically less interesting)
case of cyclic dependencies among such specifications and proved a similar composition
theorem under the additional assumption that conditions are expressible as safety properties.
Acknowledgments. We thank Martín Abadi for interesting discussions.
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A Proof of Lemma 2
Lemma 2. In the situation of the proof of Theorem 1, user Hi fulfills predicate τi. ✷
Proof. In the situation and using the notation from the proof of Theorem 1, consider running
Algorithm 1. We will prove some facts about this algorithm (when run in the situation of
Algorithm 1
1: R← {1, . . . , n}
2: repeat
3: S ← {s ∈ R | ∀ r ∈ R : τ rs = true}
4: R← R \ S
5: until R = ∅ or S = ∅
the proof of Theorem 1).
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First claim: First, we claim that Algorithm 1 always terminates with R = ∅. It obviously
suffices to prove that S 6= ∅ in each execution of Step 3: S = ∅ after any execution of Step 3
would imply that every vertex in the graph GR := (VR, ER) with
VR = {Vr | r ∈ R}, ER = {(Va, Vb) : τ
b
a 6= true}.
has nonzero out-degree, so GR contains a cycle. But this is a contradiction, since GR is a
subgraph of the graph G (as defined in (4)), and hence, must be acyclic by assumption.
Second claim: For any T ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, let HT be the combined machine that consists of H
and all machines Mt with t 6∈ T . We claim that at any point during a run of Algorithm 1,
the machine HR fulfills the predicate
πR :=

∧
r 6∈R
πr

 ∧


n∧
j=1
τHj

 .
Initially, R = {1, . . . , n}, so HR = H and πR =
∧n
j=1 τ
H
j = τ , hence the statement
is initially true by assumption about H. So suppose the statement is true at the start of a
“repeat” loop of Algorithm 1. We need to show that the statement is also true after that
loop.
In other words, we may assume that HR fulfills πR and need to show that combining the
machines Ms (s ∈ S) with HR yields a machine HR\S that fulfills πR\S .
By definition of combination and property fulfillment, it suffices to show that each newly
added submachine Ms (s ∈ S) fulfills πs, so fix an s ∈ S. Since Ms fulfills πs under
enforced condition τs, we only need to show that in all contexts in which HR\S is run,Ms’s
precondition τs is fulfilled with overwhelming probability. But by (1) and the definition of
S, τs is fulfilled whenever τHs and all τrs (with r 6∈ R) are fulfilled.
Using (3), τrs is implied by πsr and thus, using (2), also by πr. But by assumption, HR,
and hence also HR\S fulfills πR and τHs . Since s was arbitrary, this shows that HR\S fulfills
all πs (s ∈ S) and hence πR\S .
Conclusion: Using the first claims just proven, we conclude that at some point during the
algorithm run, i ∈ S. For the corresponding R at that point, we also have that HR fulfills
πR. Since i ∈ S, with the same reasoning as for the second claim in this proof, we obtain
that HR fulfills τi. Consequently, also the combined machine Hi, which consists of H and all
Mj (j 6= i) fulfills τi since i 6∈ R and thus, Hi contains all machines from the combination
HR.
25
